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Zero-sum bias: perceived competition despite unlimited 
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Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada
Zero-sum bias describes intuitively judging a situation to be zero-sum (i.e., resources gained by 
one party are matched by corresponding losses to another party) when it is actually non-zero-
sum. The experimental participants were students at a university where students’ grades are 
determined by how the quality of their work compares to a predetermined standard of quality 
rather than to the quality of the work produced by other students. This creates a non-zero-sum 
situation in which high grades are an unlimited resource. In three experiments, participants 
were shown the grade distribution after a majority of the students in a course had completed an 
assigned presentation, and asked to predict the grade of the next presenter. When many high 
grades had already been given, there was a corresponding increase in low grade predictions. 
This suggests a zero-sum bias, in which people perceive a competition for a limited resource 
despite unlimited resource availability. Interestingly, when many low grades had already been 
given, there was not a corresponding increase in high grade predictions. This suggests that a 
zero-sum heuristic is only applied in response to the allocation of desirable resources. A plausible 
explanation for the findings is that a zero-sum heuristic evolved as a cognitive adaptation to 
enable successful intra-group competition for limited resources. Implications for understanding 
inter-group interaction are also discussed.
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reminder that there are eleven more apples waiting in the kitchen 
should anyone want more, and the complainant rarely asks for 
more after eating what was initially given.
The experiments reported here were designed to test the hypoth-
esis that people are prone to perceive a competition for limited 
resources (i.e., employ a zero-sum heuristic) even when there are 
unlimited resources available. Judgments about academic perform-
ance evaluations (grades) by those being evaluated (students) are a 
perfect testing ground for this hypothesis. For students, grades are 
important resources, as they are the currency by which access to 
desired careers are bought. University course grading in the United 
States is often relative (i.e., an individual student’s grade is deter-
mined by how the quality of their work compares to the quality of 
the work produced by the other students in the course) rather than 
absolute (i.e., an individual student’s grade is determined by how 
the quality of their work compares to a predetermined standard of 
quality). Relative grading systems create a zero-sum competition 
among students, because a high grade given to one student means 
one less high grade available to the other students.
The situation is different in Canada, however. At the university 
where I teach, for example, official grading regulations prohibit 
course instructors from using a relative grading system. Moreover, 
the large majority of students at my university have little experi-
ence with relative grading, because it is also forbidden at the pri-
mary and secondary levels, and the university does not include 
relatively graded examinations, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT), as part of the admissions requirements. Absolute grading 
systems, which thus constitute the experience of the participants 
IntroductIon
The psychological and economic sciences have a long tradition of 
documenting descriptive characterizations of cognitive behavior 
that deviate from normative theories. The “heuristics and biases” 
approach, for example, seeks to identify the heuristics with which 
people make intuitive judgments, and the resulting biases that are 
deviant from normative predictions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Kahneman et al., 1982; Gilovich et al., 2002). The research reported 
here introduces a zero-sum bias.
Zero-sum, a term from game theory (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944), refers to a situation in which resources gained 
by one party are matched by corresponding losses to another party. 
Non-zero-sum will be used to refer to any other situation; for exam-
ple, when both parties gain, when both parties lose, when one party 
gains and the other neither loses nor gains, when one party loses 
and the other neither gains nor loses, etc. This paper introduces 
the term zero-sum bias to describe intuitively judging a situation 
to be zero-sum when it is actually non-zero-sum.
Unlimited resource situations, in which the gains or losses of 
one party have no effect on other parties, are non-zero-sum situ-
ations that might be prone to bias. Unlimited resource situations 
are not uncommon for people living in the first-world during the 
early twenty-first Century. A typical situation in my household 
goes something like this: My two children ask for a snack, and I 
slice an apple into sections, giving an equal number of sections 
to each. Inevitably, one of them (and often both) will claim that 
their sibling’s sections are larger, accompanied by complaints of 
unfairness. This conclusion of unfairness seems unperturbed by my 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions: (a) negatively skewed distribution (N = 278), or (b) 
symmetrical distribution (N = 278). Participants in both conditions 
were presented with the text shown below; this text was accompa-
nied by Figure 1A in the negatively-skewed condition, or Figure 1B 
in the symmetrical condition.
Consider the following scenario:
A University of Guelph course has 20 students. Each class 
includes a graded presentation by one student.
The following figure shows the grades received by the first 19 
presenters:
The 20th presenter is next.
In your judgment, what is the most likely grade to be received 
by the 20th presenter?
Choose one of the following: A, B, C, D, F.
results
The results are shown in Figure 2. Statistical analysis revealed that 
distribution condition had a significant influence on grade predic-
tion judgments [χ2
4
 = 50.30, N = 556, p < 0.001]. The normative 
hypothesis predicted that high grade predictions would be more 
likely, and low grade predictions would be less likely, in the nega-
tively skewed condition compared to the symmetrical condition. 
The zero-sum hypothesis predicted that high grade predictions 
would be less likely, and low grade predictions would be more 
likely, in the negatively skewed condition compared to the sym-
metrical condition. Separate analyses were done for each grade 
level to determine whether there was an influence of distribution 
condition. Predicted grades of A [χ2
1
 = 5.63, N = 86, p < 0.05] and 
B [χ2
1
 = 6.30, N = 254, p < 0.05] were less frequent in the negatively 
skewed condition than in the symmetrical condition. Predicted 
grades of C were not affected by distribution condition [χ2
1
 = 0.46, 
N = 138]. Predicted grades of D [χ2
1
 = 30.56, N = 55, p < 0.001] and 
F [χ2
1
 = 7.35, N = 23, p < 0.01] were more frequent in the negatively 
skewed condition than in the symmetrical condition. These results 
demonstrated a zero-sum bias.
experIment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated zero-sum bias by showing that high 
grades given to some students increased the likelihood of low 
grades being predicted for another student. Experiment 2 examined 
whether the converse is true. Some previous findings are consistent 
with the possibility that zero-sum bias could be unidirectional, 
such that gains predict losses but losses do not predict gains. For 
example, the costs of loss are perceived to outweigh the benefits 
of gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). People could thus be rela-
tively over-aware that gains by some mean might mean losses to 
others, and relatively under-aware that losses by some mean might 
mean gains to others. In the case of grades, students might be over-
concerned about the consequences of high grades given to fellow 
students, and under-concerned about the consequences of low 
grades given to fellow students. Experiment 2 examined whether 
low grades given to some students increased the likelihood of high 
grades being predicted for another student.
The condition designed to test for zero-sum bias showed partici-
pants a positively skewed distribution in which a biased individual 
might assume that many high grades were still available. Compared 
in the experiments reported here, create a non-zero-sum situation 
because if all students in a course do high-quality work, then they 
should all receive high grades. Nevertheless, informal conversa-
tions with my students have frequently revealed signs of zero-sum 
bias, and the experiments reported here represent an attempt to 
empirically characterize its prevalence.
Experiment 1 demonstrated zero-sum bias by showing that high 
grades given to some students increased the likelihood of low grades 
being predicted for other students. Experiment 2 examined whether 
the converse is true; i.e., whether zero-sum bias is a  unidirectional 
or bidirectional phenomenon. An important issue in bias research 
concerns identifying the conditions under which biases can be 
reduced. In the case of zero-sum bias among students, the non-
zero-sum nature of grading is not often explicitly stated by instruc-
tors in individual courses. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that 
reminding students of the non-zero-sum grading policy would be 
sufficient to reduce zero-sum bias.
experIment 1
In Experiment 1, student participants were asked to make a judg-
ment about a non-zero-sum situation involving grades in the con-
text of an absolute grading system. They were asked to predict the 
presentation grade of a student based on the prior performance of 
other students in the same course. The normative and zero-sum bias 
hypotheses make different suggestions about how students will use 
the performance of one party to predict the performance of another. 
Normative behavior, which takes absolute grading into account, 
would be shown if predicted grades for the student mimicked the 
grades of the other students. For example, if the grades were rela-
tively high on the presentation, then participants should conclude 
that the grading criteria were relatively favorable to students, and 
thus tend to predict that the student should do relatively well on 
the presentation (not knowing anything else about the student). 
Biased behavior, which wrongly assumes relative grading, would be 
shown if predicted grades for the student differed from the grades 
of the other students. For example, if the grades were relatively 
high on the presentation, then participants should conclude that 
no more high grades will be given, and thus tend to predict that 
the student should do relatively poorly on the presentation (not 
knowing anything else about the student).
The condition designed to test for zero-sum bias showed partici-
pants a negatively skewed distribution in which a biased individual 
might assume that all of the desirable resources (i.e., high grades) 
had already been allocated. Compared to a control condition in 
which the distribution was symmetrical (and thus that desirable 
resources might still be available), such a negatively skewed dis-
tribution might increase the likelihood of low grade predictions. 
The converse finding, that a negatively skewed distribution might 
increase the likelihood of high grade predictions, would provide 
evidence for normative judgment.
materIals and methods
Participants were 556 undergraduate students at the University of 
Guelph, all of whom had completed at least one semester of full-
time study. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, 
and the experiment was reviewed and approved by the Research 
Ethics Board of the University of Guelph.
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to a control condition in which the distribution was symmetrical 
(and thus that fewer high grades might still be available), such a 
positively skewed distribution might increase the likelihood of high 
grade predictions. The converse finding, that a positively skewed 
distribution might increase the likelihood of low grade predictions, 
would provide evidence for normative judgment.
materIals and methods
Participants were 308 undergraduate students at the University of 
Guelph, all of whom had completed at least one semester of full-
time study. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, 
and the experiment was reviewed and approved by the Research 
Ethics Board of the University of Guelph.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions: (a) positively skewed distribution (N = 154), or (b) 
symmetrical distribution (N = 154). Participants in both condi-
tions were presented with the same text as in Experiment 1; this 
text was accompanied by Figure 1B in the symmetrical condition, 
or Figure 1C in the positively skewed condition.
results
The results are shown in Figure 3. Statistical analysis revealed 
that distribution condition had a significant influence on grade 
prediction judgments [χ2
4
 = 13.77, N = 308, p < 0.01]. The nor-
mative hypothesis predicted that high grade predictions would 
be less likely, and low grade predictions would be more likely, in 
the positively skewed condition compared to the symmetrical 
condition. The zero-sum hypothesis predicted that high grade 
predictions would be more likely, and low grade predictions would 
be less likely, in the positively skewed condition compared to 
the symmetrical condition. Separate analyses were done for each 
grade level to determine whether there was an influence of distri-
bution condition. Although the trend at low and high grade levels 
was consistent with normative judgments, only one grade level 
Figure 1 | grade distributions shown to participants. Experiment 1 compared 
the influence of negatively skewed (A) and symmetrical (B) distributions. 
Experiment 2 compared the influence of positively skewed (C) and symmetrical (B) 
distributions. Experiment 3 examined the influence of information provision on the 
negatively skewed distribution (A). See Section “Materials and Methods” for the 
accompanying text that was shown to participants.
Figure 2 | Predicted grade frequency as a function of grade distribution 
condition in experiment 1. Distribution condition had a significant influence 
on grade judgments, particularly at those grade levels marked with an asterisk 
(indicating p < 0.05). Negative skew increased low grade predictions and 
decreased high grade predictions, suggesting a zero-sum bias.
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materIals and methods
Participants were 368 undergraduate students at the University of 
Guelph, all of whom had completed at least one semester of full-
time study. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, 
and the experiment was reviewed and approved by the Research 
Ethics Board of the University of Guelph.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions: (a) grading policy information (N = 184), or (b) no 
grading policy information (N = 184). Participants in both condi-
tions were shown a negatively skewed distribution (Figure 1A), and 
presented with the same text as in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants 
in the information condition only were additionally presented with 
the following text:
Note that University of Guelph grading policy states that 
“instructors are not to use predetermined, arbitrary distributions 
in the assignment of grades.” An individual student’s grade is deter-
mined by how the quality of their work compares to a predeter-
mined standard of quality, rather than by how the quality of their 
work compares to the quality of the work produced by the other 
students in the course. For this reason, exams and assignments are 
not competitions among students for some predetermined and 
limited number of A’s, B’s, etc.
Note that the no information condition was identical to the 
negatively skewed distribution condition of Experiment 1.
results
The results are shown in Figure 4. Statistical analysis revealed 
that information condition had a significant influence on grade 
prediction judgments [χ2
4
 = 18.28, N = 368, p < 0.005]. If zero-
sum bias is susceptible to reduction, then there should have been 
a lower frequency of low grade predictions and a higher frequency 
of high grade predictions in the information condition than in the 
no information condition. Separate analyses were done for each 
reached statistical significance: predicted grades of D [χ2
1
 = 7.20, 
N = 20, p < 0.01] were more frequent in the positively skewed 
condition than in the symmetrical condition. Predicted grades 
of A [χ2
1
 = 1.79, N = 56], B [χ2
1
 = 1.44, N = 136], C [χ2
1
 = 0.56, 
N = 87], and F [χ2
1
 = 2.78, N = 9, p < 0.10] were not significantly 
affected by distribution condition. Unlike a negatively skewed 
distribution, which induced zero-sum tendencies in Experiment 
1, a positively skewed distribution did not induce zero-sum ten-
dencies in Experiment 2. In fact there was the opposite tendency 
toward normative judgment. Perhaps the relatively low grades lead 
participants to the normative conclusion that the grading criteria 
were relatively unfavorable to students, and thus to predictions 
that the student should do relatively poorly on the presentation. 
The combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that zero-
sum bias is unidirectional in that people are more aware of the 
consequences of the gains of others than the losses of others.
experIment 3
An important issue in bias research concerns identifying the con-
ditions under which biases can be reduced. In the case of zero-
sum bias among students, the non-zero-sum nature of grading 
is not often explicitly stated by instructors in individual courses. 
Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that reminding students of 
the non-zero-sum grading policy would be sufficient to reduce 
zero-sum bias.
Because it was shown to induce zero-sum bias in Experiment 
1, participants in Experiment 3 were shown a negatively skewed 
distribution (Figure 1A). Before making a grade prediction, half 
of the participants were given information reminding them of the 
absolute grading policy at the university. If zero-sum bias is sus-
ceptible to reduction, then such information should decrease the 
likelihood of low grade predictions and increase the likelihood of 
high grade predictions.
Figure 3 | Predicted grade frequency as a function of grade distribution 
condition in experiment 2. Distribution condition had a significant influence 
on grade judgments, particularly at the grade level marked with an asterisk 
(indicating p < 0.05). Consistent with normative judgment, positive skew 
increased low grade predictions and decreased high grade predictions.
Figure 4 | Predicted grade frequency as a function of information 
condition in experiment 3. Information condition had a significant influence 
on grade judgments, particularly at those grade levels marked with an asterisk 
(indicating p < 0.05). Information decreased low grade predictions and 
increased high grade predictions.
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people most of the time. Even the student participants examined 
here, one might argue, are not unwise to be wary of resource avail-
ability. For example, although grading policy makes it possible that 
many students in a course receive very high grades, such an occur-
rence rarely happens in practice. Instructors know that this is true 
because the quality of student work is almost always symmetrically 
distributed around a mid-range mean. From the student perspec-
tive, however, the relatively small likelihood of getting a very high 
grade could justify zero-sum intuitions.
The unidirectionality of zero-sum bias also makes sense from 
a cognitive/evolutionary perspective, given that limited resource 
situations are the historical norm. When resources are limited, 
the allocation of desirable resources means that those resources 
will soon be depleted. Thus people are wary of the consequences 
of desirable resource allocation, and zero-sum bias occurs when 
resources are unlimited. On the other hand, the allocation of unde-
sirable resources has no implications for the depletion of desirable 
resources because desirable resources are either still available or 
already depleted. Thus people are less wary of the consequences 
of undesirable resource allocation, and judgments are normative 
when resources are unlimited.
In summary, it is possible that a zero-sum heuristic evolved as 
a cognitive adaptation to enable successful intra-group compe-
tition for limited resources. Similar arguments have been made 
concerning other examples of imperfect intuitive judgments 
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gigerenzer 
and Selten, 2002; Todd et al., 2005; Haselton and Nettle, 2006; 
Wilke and Barrett, 2009). It is important to note, however, that 
the experiments reported here provide insufficient evidence for 
the conclusion that a zero-sum heuristic is a cognitive adaptation. 
Applying the framework suggested by Schmitt and Pilcher (2004) 
for evaluating evidence for adaptation, the experiments provide 
insufficient breadth in that only psychological evidence (more spe-
cifically cognitive reasoning specificity) has been provided. Other 
forms of evidence are necessary before it can be concluded that 
the zero-sum heuristic is an adaptation.
It is also important to consider possible non-evolutionary rea-
sons for why zero-sum bias was demonstrated in these experiments. 
The most obvious is that the student participants have been raised 
in a culture in which peers are considered competitors for a limited 
number of desirable career opportunities, and they have learned to 
treat all career-oriented activities (e.g., school) as limited resource 
situations. When resources are unlimited, such as at a university that 
prohibits relative grading, they are prone to zero-sum bias. Cultural 
factors and individual differences that could affect the application 
of a zero-sum heuristic are also considered below.
socIetal ImplIcatIons
The cognitive/evolutionary perspective favors an interpretation of 
zero-sum bias as a legacy of intra-group competition because psy-
chological adaptations likely evolved at a time when inter-group 
interactions were relatively rare. Since that time, the likelihood of 
inter-group interaction has risen significantly. Thus it is interesting 
to consider how the zero-sum heuristic could affect judgments 
of inter-group interactions. Applied to inter-group judgments, 
the zero-sum heuristic would lead to the conclusion that a gain 
by another group (outgroup) means a  corresponding loss for 
grade level to determine whether there was an influence of distribu-
tion condition. Although the trend at low and high grade levels was 
consistent with bias reduction, only the low grade levels reached 
statistical significance: predicted grades of D [χ2
1
 = 5.77, N = 39, 
p < 0.05] and F [χ2
1
 = 9.00, N = 16, p < 0.005] were less frequent in 
the information condition than in the no information condition. 
Predicted grades of A [χ2
1
 = 2.47, N = 49], B [χ2
1
 = 0.82, N = 147], 
and C [χ2
1
 = 0.21, N = 117] were not significantly affected by infor-
mation condition. These results demonstrated that information 
provision reduced zero-sum bias.
dIscussIon
In three experiments, participants were shown the grade distribu-
tion after a majority of the students in a university course had 
completed an assigned presentation, and asked to predict the grade 
of the next presenter. A negatively skewed distribution, indicating 
that many high grades (desirable resource) had already been given, 
increased the likelihood of low grade (undesirable resource) predic-
tions (Experiment 1). I suggest that this tendency is the result of a 
zero-sum heuristic that is applied indiscriminately when desirable 
resources have been allocated. Under non-zero-sum conditions, for 
example when there are unlimited resources available, the applica-
tion of this heuristic leads to the biased judgment that no more 
desirable resources are available. In other words, people are prone 
to perceive a competition for limited resources even when there 
are unlimited resources available.
A positively skewed distribution, indicating that many low 
grades had already been given, did not increase the likelihood 
of high grade predictions (Experiment 2). This suggests that the 
zero-sum heuristic is not applied when undesirable resources are 
allocated.
In Experiment 3, participants were reminded that university 
grading policy prohibits instructors from placing limits on the 
availability of high grades, and this reminder mitigated the effect 
of a negatively skewed distribution on grade predictions.
Is the zero-sum heurIstIc a cognItIve adaptatIon?
Popular books (Wright, 2000; Rubin, 2002) have suggested that 
modern humans have a tendency toward zero-sum intuitions, and 
that such a tendency is a legacy of intra-group resource allocation 
and competition for status during a time when evolving humans 
lived as hunter-gatherers in relatively small groups. Intra-group 
competition resulted when finite resources (e.g., mates, high-status 
positions, food) were not guaranteed to be allocated evenly across 
group members. Uneven resource allocation could have arisen out 
of necessity (there simply was not enough to go around) or oth-
erwise (high-status members controlled resource allocation and 
chose uneven allocation). Such conditions would have promoted 
the evolution of affective and cognitive adaptations to enable suc-
cessful competition. Affective adaptations could include envy (Hill 
and Buss, 2008), and cognitive adaptations could include a zero-
sum heuristic, because gains by others often meant losses to oneself, 
especially for indivisible resources such as mates and high-status 
positions in a well-organized hierarchy.
Although it can lead to bias, a zero-sum heuristic is sensible in 
that unlimited resource situations were likely rare during the era in 
which modern humans evolved, and are likely rare today for most 
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Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994) are more likely 
to show zero-sum tendencies when expressing attitudes about 
immigration (Esses et al., 2003). It also seems likely that people 
from collectivistic cultures would be less likely to show zero-
sum tendencies. As for situational factors, it would not be at 
all surprising if groups who are chronically or currently low 
in socioeconomic status are more likely to jump to zero-sum 
conclusions (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996), or if public resistance 
to trade and immigration is greatest at times of economic stress. 
I suggest that the cognitive/evolutionary and social science per-
spectives are compatible. In other words, a heuristic possessed 
by all humans is more likely to be used by some individuals, in 
some cultures, and/or in some situations.
Social scientists have also offered ideas related to the reduction 
of zero-sum bias. For example, editorials targeting zero-sum beliefs 
might affect attitudes toward immigrants (Esses et al., 2003). Putting 
two groups in non-zero-sum situations in which cooperation leads 
to mutual gain and competition leads to mutual loss, such as in the 
Robber’s Cave experiment (Sherif et al., 1961), could conceivably 
reduce zero-sum bias (Wright, 2000). Economists credit econom-
ics education, such as providing historical examples of win-win 
trading, for public acceptance of trade agreements (Rubin, 2002). 
Future research will explore the efficacy of various strategies for 
the reduction of zero-sum bias.
On the other hand, there is reason to be concerned that pub-
licizing zero-sum bias could result in the treatment of accurate 
zero-sum conclusions as inaccurate. For example, there are his-
torical examples of win-lose trading. Proponents of free trade 
argue that such situations are temporary in that the losers even-
tually learn to discontinue trade. Nevertheless, when advocating 
for a proposed trade agreement, it is not sufficient to argue that 
the continuation of the agreement is contingent upon mutual 
benefit, or that there are historical examples of mutually ben-
eficial trade agreements. The argument should instead be based 
on the likelihood that the proposed agreement will be mutually 
beneficial.
Earlier I suggested that the unidirectionality of zero-sum bias 
is related to self-interest – in a zero-sum world there is greater 
incentive to be wary of the gains of others than the losses of oth-
ers. This could explain why members of the middle class tend 
to be more concerned about the wealth of the upper class than 
the poverty of the lower class. One might say that envy is more 
powerful than guilt. The social science approach, on the other 
hand, might emphasize the possibility that some individuals or 
cultures are more concerned about whether personal gain comes 
at a cost to others. For example, one might hypothesize that zero-
sum bias will be bidirectional for people from collectivistic cul-
tures, or for individuals high in egalitarianism (Katz and Hass, 
1988), prosociality (Van Lange et al., 1997; Kurzban and Houser, 
2005), or collectivism (Triandis, 1995). Future research will test 
this hypothesis.
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one’s own group (ingroup). Social scientists suspect that zero-
sum thinking is the basis of psychological barriers to inter-group 
interaction. For example, economists blame zero-sum intuitions 
for public resistance to free trade because people find it hard to 
comprehend how both trading partners could gain, even though 
win–win scenarios are a common consequence of trade (Rubin, 
2002). Similarly, the outsourcing of jobs to another country is very 
vulnerable to zero-sum-based resistance because the most direct 
and visible consequence is a gain of jobs by one country with a 
corresponding loss of jobs by another. Assuming that the CEOs 
of major corporations can be considered a group, public anger 
over high executive pay could stem from the feeling that their gain 
is our loss. Zero-sum perceptions have also been implicated as a 
contributing factor to inter-group prejudice (Bobo and Hutchings, 
1996; Esses et al., 2005) and public resistance to immigration (Esses 
et al., 2003).
There is even evidence that consumers apply a zero-sum heuris-
tic when evaluating products (Chernev, 2007). When two products 
(e.g., laundry detergents) are compared on a particular attribute 
(e.g., stain removal capability), the product that claims to specialize 
in that attribute is perceived as superior to a product that claims to 
have multiple specializations (e.g., stain removal, fading resistance, 
static prevention). Chernev (2007) suggested that the commitment 
of resources to the other attributes is perceived to come at a cost 
to the attribute-of-interest.
The research reported here examined perceptions of those 
who are affected by resource allocation (non-allocators), rather 
than those who make decisions about resource allocation (allo-
cators). The complementary study of allocators, specifically 
those who must allocate resources among ingroup and out-
group members, has a long history in social psychology (Tajfel, 
1970; Brewer, 1979). Such studies have demonstrated favorit-
ism toward ingroup members, as well as zero-sum tendencies. 
Brewer and Silver (1978), for example, had participants choose 
monetary rewards (from among a choice matrix determined by 
the experimenters) for one ingroup and one outgroup mem-
ber. Choices that maximized the reward for the ingroup mem-
ber also provided large rewards for the outgroup member, and 
participants instead favored choices that maximized the differ-
ence between the ingroup and outgroup members, even when it 
meant a  smaller-than-maximum reward for the ingroup member. 
Although both parties gained as a result of this choice, I suggest 
that this difference-maximization strategy is a manifestation 
of a zero-sum heuristic because it shows an irrational aversion 
to outgroup gains. Another example can be seen in the results 
reported by Tajfel (1970), who showed that participants allocat-
ing resources to two ingroup members chose to maximize joint 
profit whereas participants allocating resources to two outgroup 
members chose instead to split a smaller amount evenly. This is 
another example of irrational outgroup gain aversion that can be 
attributed to the zero-sum heuristic.
The pervasiveness of zero-sum thinking leads me to wonder 
whether it is a cognitive adaptation possessed by all humans 
(and probably other social animals as well). This offers a 
slightly different perspective from some social scientists who 
have emphasized individual differences, cultural differences, 
and situational factors. For example, individuals high in Social 
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